Monopoly versus R&D‐integrated Duopoly

Rabah Amir (), Niels Nannerup, Anna Stepanova and Eline Eguiazarova
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Anna Cartwright

Manchester School, 2002, vol. 70, issue 1, 88-100

Abstract: In the standard two‐stage framework of R&D/product market competition, this paper provides a performance comparison between monopoly and the cartelized research joint venture, using two well‐known models based on different versions of the R&D spillover process. According to the model with a wider scope of application, monopoly always leads to a higher propensity for R&D and, when R&D costs are low, to the best overall market performance. The results also allow for a comparison between the two underlying models of strategic R&D.

Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9957.00285

Related works:
Working Paper: Monopoly versus R&D-integrated duopoly (2002)
Working Paper: Monopoly versus R&D-integrated duopoly (2001)
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