Cross‐licensing and competition

Doh-Shin Jeon and Yassine Lefouili

RAND Journal of Economics, 2018, vol. 49, issue 3, 656-671

Abstract: We analyze the competitive effects of bilateral cross‐licensing agreements in a setting with many competing firms. We show that firms can sustain the monopoly outcome if they can sign unconstrained bilateral cross‐licensing contracts. This result is robust to increasing the number of firms who can enter into a cross‐licensing agreement. We also investigate the scenario in which a cross‐licensing contract cannot involve the payment of a royalty by a licensee who decides ex post not to use the licensed technology. Finally, policy implications regarding the antitrust treatment of cross‐licensing agreements are derived.

Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12248

Related works:
Working Paper: Cross-Licensing and competition (2018)
Working Paper: Cross-Licensing and Competition (2017)
Working Paper: Cross-Licensing and Competition (2015)
Working Paper: Cross-Licensing and Competition (2015)
Working Paper: Cross-Licensing and Competition (2013)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bla:randje:v:49:y:2018:i:3:p:656-671

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.blackwell ... al.asp?ref=0741-6261

Access Statistics for this article

RAND Journal of Economics is currently edited by James Hosek

More articles in RAND Journal of Economics from RAND Corporation Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Wiley Content Delivery ().