RJVs and Price Collusione under Endogenous Product Differentiation

Luca Lambertini (), Sougata Poddar () and D. Sasaki

Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna

Abstract: We characterise the interplay between firms' decisions in product development, be it joint or independent, and their ensuing repeated price behaviour, either collusive or Bertrand- Nash. Firms face a choice between participating in a joint venture inventing a single product, and in independent ventures developing their respective products which can be either horizontally or vertically differentiated. We prove that joint product development and the resulting lack of horizontal product differentiation may destabilise collusion, whilst firms' R&D decisions have no bearings on collusive stability in the vertical differentiation setting. We also discover the non-monotone dependence of firms' venture decisions at the development stage upon their intertemporal preferences, as well as upon consumers' willingness to pay.

Date: 1997-06
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://amsacta.unibo.it/5015/1/295.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: RJVs and Price collusion Under Endogenous Product Differentiation (1998)
Working Paper: RJVs and Price Collusion under Endogenous Product Differentiation (1997)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bol:bodewp:295

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dipartimento Scienze Economiche, Universita' di Bologna ().