Enforcement of Merger Control. Theoretical Insights for Its Procedural Design

Andreea Cosnita-Langlais

Revue économique, 2016, vol. 67, issue HS1, 39-51

Abstract: This paper reviews the theoretical underpinnings of the main procedural choices for merger control enforcement. At each relevant stage we highlight the economic trade-offs behind the corresponding procedural choices: mandatory vs. voluntary pre-merger notification, ex ante vs. ex post merger review, and the type of decision eventually made, binary or not. The paper also identifies the missing debates that still need formal treatment. Our study provides insight for the optimal procedural design of merger control, and as such may be useful to understand the different choices made by the various jurisdictions for merger policy enforcement.

Date: 2016
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Related works:
Working Paper: Enforcement of merger control: theoretical insights for its procedural design (2016)
Working Paper: Enforcement of Merger Control: Theoretical insights for its Procedural Design (2015)
Working Paper: Enforcement of Merger Control: Theoretical insights for its Procedural Design (2015)
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