Incentives to Vaccinate

Pol Campos-Mercade, Armando N. Meier, Stephan Meier, Devin Pope, Florian H. Schneider and Erik Wengström

No 11379, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: Whether monetary incentives to change behavior work and how they should be structured are fundamental economic questions. We overcome typical data limitations in a large-scale field experiment on vaccination (N = 5, 324) with a unique combi-nation of administrative and survey data. We find that guaranteed incentives of $20 increase uptake by 13 percentage points in the short run and 9 in the long run. Guaranteed incentives are more effective than lottery-based, prosocial, or individually-targeted incentives, though all boost vaccinations. There are no unintended consequences on future vaccination or heterogeneities based on vaccination attitudes and incentivized economic preferences. Further, administrative data on relatives shows substantial positive spillovers. Our findings demonstrate the great potential of incentives for improving public health and provide guidance on their design.

Keywords: incentives; health behaviour; social preferences; prosociality; risk preferences; vaccination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D01 D62 I12 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-hea and nep-nud
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Related works:
Working Paper: Incentives to Vaccinate (2024)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_11379

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