Heterogeneous CEO Death Effects
Dirk Jenter,
Egor Matveyev and
Lukas Roth
No 13125, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo
Abstract:
This paper analyzes changes in firm value, performance, and behavior caused by CEO deaths. Many deaths trigger large stock price changes—shareholders believe that some CEOs add shareholder value, but others are seen as not optimally matched or overpaid. These value changes are correlated with CEO and firm characteristics (e.g., deaths of old CEOs tend to add value), but much of the variation remains unexplained. The market reactions predict changes in operating performance, indicating that shareholders know which CEOs improve performance and which do not. The evidence suggests that CEOs are important, but also that many reduce shareholder value.
Keywords: CEOs; CEO death; CEO-firm matching; CEO labor markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 M12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.ifo.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp13125.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: Heterogeneous CEO Death Effects (2026) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_13125
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Klaus Wohlrabe ().