Competition for the International Pool of Talent: Education Policy and Student Mobility

Alexander Haupt (), Tim Krieger and Thomas Lange

No 3421, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: This paper presents a model of two countries competing for a pool of students from the rest of the world (ROW). In equilibrium, one country offers high educational quality for high tuition fees, while the other country provides a low quality and charges low fees. The quality in the high quality country, the tuition fees, and the quality and tuition fee differential between the countries increase with the income prospects in ROW and the number of international students. Higher stay rates of foreign students lead to more ambiguous results. In particular, an increase in educational quality can be accompanied by a decline in tuition fees. Furthermore, international competition for students can give rise to a brain gain in ROW.

Keywords: higher education; student mobility; vertical quality differentiation; return migration; brain gain (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F22 H87 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Competition for the International Pool of Talent: Education Policy and Student Mobility (2011)
Working Paper: Competition for the International Pool of Talent: Education Policy and Student Mobility (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3421

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