Optimal Student Loans and Graduate Tax under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection

Robert Gary-Bobo () and Alain Trannoy

No 4279, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We completely characterize the set of second-best optimal “menus”of student-loan contracts in a simple economy with risky labour-market outcomes, adverse selection, moral hazard and risk aversion. The model combines structured student loans and an elementary optimal income-tax problem à la Mirrlees. This combination can be called a graduate tax. There are two categories of second-best optima: the equal treatment and the separating allocations. The equal treatment case is obtained when the social weights of student types are close to their population frequencies; the expected utilities of different types are then equalized, conditional on the event of success on the labor market. But individuals are ex ante unequal because of differing probabilities of success, and ex post unequal, because the income tax trades o¤ incentives and insurance (redistribution). In separating optima, the talented types bear more risk than the less-talented ones; they arise only if the social weight of the talented types is sufficiently high. The second-best optimal graduate tax provides incomplete insurance because of moral hazard; it typically involves cross-subsidies; generically, it cannot be decomposed as the sum of an optimal income tax depending only on earnings, and a loan repayment, depending only on education. Therefore, optimal loan repayments must be income-contingent.

Keywords: student loans; graduate tax; optimal income tax; adverse selection; moral hazard; risk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D60 D82 H21 I22 I24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal student loans and graduate tax under moral hazard and adverse selection (2015)
Working Paper: Optimal student loans and graduate tax under moral hazard and adverse selection (2015)
Working Paper: Optimal Student Loans and Graduate Tax under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection (2015)
Working Paper: Optimal Student Loans and Graduate Tax under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection (2014)
Working Paper: Optimal Student Loans and Graduate Tax under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection (2014)
Working Paper: Optimal Student Loans and Graduate Tax under Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection (2013)
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