The German UMTS Design: Insights From Multi-Object Auction Theory

Christian Ewerhart and Benny Moldovanu ()

No 680, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We briefly survey several insights about value and revenue maximization in multi-object auctions and apply them to the German (and Austrian) UMTS auction. In particular, we discuss in detail the exposure problem that caused firms in Germany to pay almost Euro 20 billion for nothing.

Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: The German UMTS design: insights from multi-object auction theory (2002)
Working Paper: The German UMTS Design: Insights From Multi-Object Auction Theory (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_680

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