The Principal-Agent Matching Market

Kaniska Dam
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: David Perez-Castrillo

No 945, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo

Abstract: We propose a model based on competitive markets in order to analyse an economy with several principals and agents. We model the principal-agent economy as a two-sided matching game and characterise the set of stable outcomes of this principal-agent matching market. A simple mechanism to implement the set of stable outcomes is proposed. Finally, we put forward examples of principal-agent economies where the results fit.

Keywords: principal-agent; moral hazard; matching; implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Principal-Agent Matching Market (2006)
Working Paper: The principal-agent matching market (2006)
Working Paper: The Principal-Agent Matching Market (2001)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_945

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