The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks

Dan Kovenock, Brian Roberson () and Roman Sheremeta
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Brian Roberson: Purdue University, Department of Economics, Krannert School of Management

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: We experimentally test the qualitatively different equilibrium predictions of two theoretical models of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of targets. In such a network, the attacker’s objective is to successfully attack at least one target and the defender’s objective is to defend all targets. The models differ in how the conflict at each target is modeled — specifically, the lottery and auction contest success functions (CSFs). Consistent with equilibrium in the auction CSF model, attackers utilize a stochastic “guerrilla-warfare” strategy, which involves randomly attacking at most one target with a random level of force. Inconsistent with equilibrium in the lottery CSF model, attackers use the “guerrilla-warfare” strategy and attack only one target instead of the equilibrium “complete-coverage” strategy that attacks all targets. Consistent with equilibrium in both models, as the attacker’s valuation increases, the average resource expenditure, the probability of winning, and the average payoff increase (decrease) for the attacker (defender).

Keywords: Colonel Blotto; weakest-link; best-shot; multi-dimensional resource allocation; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C91 D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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https://www.chapman.edu/research/institutes-and-ce ... blotto-sheremeta.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: The attack and defense of weakest-link networks (2019)
Working Paper: The attack and defense of weakest-link networks (2018)
Working Paper: The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks (2010)
Working Paper: The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks (2010)
Working Paper: The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:17-19

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