The Dictatorial Public Goods Game

Gabriele Camera, Gary Charness, Nir Chemeya and Ro'i Zultan
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Gabriele Camera: ESI, Chapman University
Nir Chemeya: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
Ro'i Zultan: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

Working Papers from Chapman University, Economic Science Institute

Abstract: We propose a novel game, the Dictatorial Public Goods Game, to study the interplay between collective resource generation and centralized provision of public goods. After making choices in a standard VoluntaryContribution Mechanism (VCM), one player is selected from the group to administrate the contributions: either provide the public good or expropriate the collected resources for personal gain. We find that adding this centralized mechanism reduces efficiency compared to the standard VCM. Although higher contributions increase the material incentive to expropriate, they lead to more provision. Thus, pro-social choices in the contribution and in the provision stages act as complements, reflecting the generation of social capital in the group. Administrators tend to provide more when the statutory default is expropriation rather than provision. This counter status-quo effect is in line with the standard provision-maintenance gap in the literature, but is not explained by the theoretical arguments typically invoked to explain such framing effects.

Keywords: group decision-making; public goods; repeated games; institutions; framing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chu:wpaper:26-05

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