Dictatorial domains

Navin Aswal, Shurojit Chatterji and Arunava Sen
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Navin Aswal: University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, USA

No 1999040, LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: In this paper, we introduce the notion of a linked domain and prove that a non-manipulable social choice function defined on such a domain must be dictatorial. This result not only generalizes the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem but also demonstrates that the equivalence between dictatorship and non-manipulability is far more robust than suggested by that theorem. We provide an application of this result in a particular model of voting. We also provide a necessary condition for a domain to be dictatorial and characterize dictatorial domains in the cases where the number of alternatives is three and four.

Date: 1999-07-05
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Journal Article: Dictatorial domains (2003)
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