Can partial fiscal coordination be welfare worsening? A model of tax competition

Maurice Marchand, Pierre Pestieau and Motohiro Sato

No 1648, LIDAM Reprints CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Date: 2003-01-01
Note: In : Journal of Urban Economics, 54, 451-458, 2003
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Journal Article: Can partial fiscal coordination be welfare worsening?: A model of tax competition (2003)
Working Paper: Can partial fiscal coordination be welfare worsening ? A model of tax competition (2002)
Working Paper: Can Partial Fiscal Coordination Be Welfare Worsening? A model of tax competition (2002)
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