Dividing the expected payoff resulting from joint actions

Pierre Dehez ()
Additional contact information
Pierre Dehez: Université catholique de Louvain, LIDAM/CORE, Belgium

No 3315, LIDAM Reprints CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Abstract: We consider situations where players hit targets with known probabilities and are rewarded according to given rules. The division of the expected payoff resulting from their joint actions is studied in the context of transferable utility games, using the Shapley value as the allocation rule.

Pages: 10
Date: 2024-09-30
Note: In: Economics Bulletin, 2024, vol. 44(3), p. 880-888
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cor:louvrp:3315

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in LIDAM Reprints CORE from Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) Voie du Roman Pays 34, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve (Belgium). Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Alain GILLIS ().