Marketplaces and Matching

Melvyn Coles and Eric Smith

No 1048, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper models equilibrium trading patterns when marketplaces exist and goods are differentiated. When first visiting the market, a buyer samples a stock of goods. If fortunate, the buyer matches with and purchases one of these goods and then exits the market. If an initial match does not exist, the buyer can now only match with the flow of new goods for sale. The previous stock has been sampled and rejected. In a steady state, the current stock of unmatched traders on one side of the market is trying to match with the flow of new traders on the other side. It is shown that this market behaviour describes matching patterns between unemployed job seekers and vacancies in UK Job Centres.

Keywords: Marketplaces; Matching; Unemployment Hazards (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1994-10
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=1048 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Marketplaces and Matching (1998)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1048

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... ers/dp.php?dpno=1048

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().