Collaboration in Bipartite Networks

Chih-Sheng Hsieh, Michael Koenig, Xiaodong Liu and Christian Zimmermann

No 13239, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper proposes a general framework for studying the impact of collaboration on team production. We build a micro-founded model for team production, where collaboration between agents is represented by a bipartite network. The Nash equilibrium of the game incorporates both the complementarity effect between collaborating agents and the substitutability effect between concurrent projects of the same agent. We propose a Bayesian DMH procedure to estimate the structural parameters and illustrate the empirical and policy relevance of the model by analyzing the collaboration network of inventors in the semiconductor and pharmaceutical industries.

Keywords: Bipartite; networks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C31 C72 O31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-net and nep-sog
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Working Paper: Collaboration in Bipartite Networks (2022)
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