A Model of Competing Narratives

Kfir Eliaz and Ran Spiegler ()

No 13319, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We formalize the argument that political disagreements can be traced to a "clash of narratives". Drawing on the "Bayesian Networks" literature, we model a narrative as a causal model that maps actions into consequences, weaving a selection of other random variables into the story. An equilibrium is defined as a probability distribution over narrative-policy pairs that maximizes a representative agent's anticipatory utility, capturing the idea that public opinion favors hopeful narratives. Our equilibrium analysis sheds light on the structure of prevailing narratives, the variables they involve, the policies they sustain and their contribution to political polarization.

Keywords: Narratives; Polarization; Model misspecification; Political competition; Anticipatory utility (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-upt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: A Model of Competing Narratives (2020)
Working Paper: A Model of Competing Narratives (2018)
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