Firing Costs, Unions and Employment

Alison Booth

No 1347, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This paper develops a simple model of employment, non-statutory redundancy pay and wage determination. An interesting feature of this model is that the contract curve is vertical. Some of the predictions of the model are confronted with the available British data on non-statutory firing costs, from the 1990 Workplace Industrial Relations Survey. The estimates indicate: first, that bargaining over redundancy pay is more prevalent in plants with a strong union presence; second, that bargaining over redundancy pay has no impact on recent employment variation for plants in the sample; and third, that financial performance is unaffected by manual bargaining, but is positively associated with non-manual bargaining.

Keywords: Employment; Financial Performance; Firing Costs; Redundancy Pay; Unions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J32 J33 J51 J65 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996-03
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cepr.org/active/publications/discussion_papers/dp.php?dpno=1347 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:1347

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.cepr.org/ ... ers/dp.php?dpno=1347

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX, UK.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CEPR ().