Does CFPB Oversight Crimp Credit?

Matthew Plosser and James Vickery ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Andreas Fuster

No 15681, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We study how regulatory oversight by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) affects mortgage credit supply and other aspects of bank behavior. We use a difference-in-differences approach exploiting changes in regulatory intensity and a size cutoff below which banks are exempt from CFPB scrutiny. CFPB oversight leads to a reduction in lending in the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) market, which primarily serves riskier borrowers. However, it is also associated with a lower transition probability from moderate to serious delinquency, suggesting that tighter regulatory oversight may reduce foreclosures. Our results underscore the trade-off between protecting borrowers and maintaining access to credit.

Keywords: Consumer financial protection; Regulation; Mortgages; Servicing; Credit supply (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D18 G21 G28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Does CFPB Oversight Crimp Credit? (2020)
Working Paper: Does CFPB Oversight Crimp Credit? (2018)
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