Market Structure, Investment and Technical Efficiencies in Mobile Telecommunications

Marc Ivaldi, Jonathan Elliott, Georges Vivien Houngbonon and Paul Scott

No 16111, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: We develop a model of competition in prices and infrastructural investment among mobile network providers. Market shares and service quality (download speed) are simultaneously determined, for demand affects the network load just as delivered quality affects consumer demand. While consolidation typically has adverse impacts on consumer surplus, economies of scale (which we derive from physical principles) push in the other direction, and we find that consumer surplus is maximized at a moderate number of firms, and that the optimal number of firms is higher for lower income consumers. Our modeling framework allows us to quantify the marginal social value of allocating more spectrum to mobile telecommunications, finding it is roughly five times an individual firm’s willingness to pay for a marginal unit of spectrum.

Keywords: Mobile telecommunications; Market structure; Infrastructure; Scale efficiency; Antitrust policy; Endogenous quality; Queuing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D22 L13 L40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-05
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Related works:
Journal Article: Market Structure, Investment, and Technical Efficiencies in Mobile Telecommunications (2025)
Working Paper: Market Structure, Investment and Technical Efficiencies in Mobile Telecommunications (2024)
Working Paper: Market Structure, Investment and Technical Efficiencies in Mobile Telecommunications (2024)
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