Electoral Turnovers

Benjamin Marx, Vincent Pons and Vincent Rollet

No 17047, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: In most national elections, voters face a key choice between continuity and change. Electoral turnovers occur when the incumbent candidate or party fails to win reelection. To understand how turnovers affect national outcomes, we study all presidential and parliamentary elections held globally between 1946 and 2018. We document the prevalence of turnovers over time and estimate their effects on economic performance, human development, and the quality of democracy. Using a close-elections regression discontinuity design across countries, we show that turnovers improve several measures of country performance. To explain these positive effects, we explore how electoral turnovers affect leader characteristics, shape policy decisions, reduce perceived corruption, and foster accountability.

Keywords: Elections; Turnovers; Democracy; Institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 O43 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-02
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Related works:
Working Paper: Electoral Turnovers (2022)
Working Paper: Electoral Turnovers (2022)
Working Paper: Electoral Turnovers (2022)
Working Paper: Electoral Turnovers (2022)
Working Paper: Electoral Turnovers (2022)
Working Paper: Electoral Turnovers (2022)
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