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Political Activists as Free-Riders: Evidence From a Natural Field Experiment

Anselm Hager, Lukas Hensel, Johannes Hermle and Christopher Roth

No 17168, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: How does a citizen's decision to participate in political activism depend on the participation of others? We conduct a nation-wide natural field experiment in collaboration with a major European party during a recent national election. In a party survey, we randomly provide canvassers with true information about the canvassing intentions of their peers. When learning that more peers participate in canvassing than previously believed, canvassers significantly reduce both their canvassing intentions and behavior. An additional survey among party supporters underscores the importance of free-riding motives and reveals that there is strong heterogeneity in motives underlying supporters' behavioral responses.

Date: 2022-04
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Related works:
Journal Article: Political Activists as Free Riders: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment (2023) Downloads
Working Paper: Political Activists as Free-Riders: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment (2022) Downloads
Working Paper: Political Activists as Free-Riders: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment (2020) Downloads
Working Paper: Political Activists as Free-Riders: Evidence from a Natural Field Experiment (2019) Downloads
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