Corporate Governance, Meritocracy and Careers

Marco Pagano and Luca Picariello

No 17235, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Firms may pursue non-meritocratic promotion policies at the cost of lower pro fitability, if they yield private bene ts of control. Corporate governance standards that limit these private bene fits favor meritocratic promotions, and thereby encourage workers' skill acquisition. Managerial incentive pay has ambiguous effects on workers' skill acquisition: it fosters the supply of skilled labor, while reducing firms' willingness to promote skilled workers to managerial positions. Social welfare increases with the share of meritocratic firms, but not necessarily with governance standards: small reforms generate losers and gainers, and may on balance lower welfare, while drastic enough reforms can generate Pareto improvements.

Keywords: Corporate governance; Careers; Meritocracy; Job selection; Skill development (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D23 M50 M51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-04
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Journal Article: Corporate governance, meritocracy, and careers (2025)
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