Using Employer Hiring Behaviour to Test the Educational Signalling Hypothesis

Jan van Ours and James Albrecht

No 2968, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: This Paper presents a test of the educational signalling hypothesis. If employers use education as a signal in the hiring process, they will rely more on education when less is otherwise known about applicants. We find that employers are more likely to lower educational standards when an informal, more informative recruitment channel is used, so we conclude that education is used as a signal in the hiring process.

Keywords: Recruitment; Signalling (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Using Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the Educational Signaling Hypothesis* (2006)
Working Paper: Using Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the Educational Signaling Hypothesis (2001)
Working Paper: Using Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the Educational Signaling Hypothesis (2001)
Working Paper: Using Employer Hiring Behavior to Test the Educational Signaling Hypothesis (2001)
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