Characteristics, Contracts and Actions: Evidence from Venture Capitalist Analyses

Steven Kaplan () and Strömberg, Per
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Per Stromberg

No 3243, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: We study the investment analyses of 67 portfolio investments by 11 venture capital (VC) firms. VCs consider the attractiveness and risks of the business, management, and deal terms as well as expected post-investment monitoring. We then consider the relation of the analyses to the contractual terms. Greater internal and external risks are associated with more VC cash flow rights, VC control rights; greater internal risk, also with more contingencies for the entrepreneur; and greater complexity, with less contingent compensation. Finally, expected VC monitoring and support are related to the contracts. We interpret these results in relation to financial contracting theories.

Keywords: Investment banking; Venture capital; Financing policy; Capital and ownership structure; Brokerage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G24 G32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34)

Downloads: (external link)
https://cepr.org/publications/DP3243 (application/pdf)
CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

Related works:
Working Paper: Characteristics, Contracts and Actions: Evidence from Venture Capitalist Analyses (2003)
Working Paper: Characteristics, Contracts, and Actions: Evidence from Venture Capitalist Analyses (2002)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3243

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://cepr.org/publications/DP3243

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DX.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().