Courts: The Lex Mundi project

Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes () and Andrei Shleifer

No 3344, CEPR Discussion Papers from C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers

Abstract: In cooperation with Lex Mundi member law firms in 109 countries, we measure and describe the exact procedures used by litigants and courts to evict a tenant for non-payment of rent and to collect a bounced check. We use these data to construct an index of procedural formalism of dispute resolution for each country. We find that such formalism is systematically greater in civil than in common law countries. Moreover, procedural formalism is associated with higher expected duration of judicial proceedings, more corruption, less consistency, less honesty, less fairness in judicial decisions, and inferior access to justice. These results suggest that legal transplantation may have led to an inefficiently high level of procedural formalism, particularly in developing countries.

Keywords: Courts; Judicial efficiency; enforcement of contracts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K40 P50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (46)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Courts: the Lex Mundi Project (2003)
Working Paper: Courts: The Lex Mundi Project (2003)
Working Paper: Courts: The Lex Mundi Project (2003)
Working Paper: Courts: The Lex Mundi Project (2002)
Working Paper: Courts: the Lex Mundi Project (2002)
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