Land deals in Africa: pioneers and speculators

Anthony Venables and Paul Collier

No 8644, CEPR Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Policy Research

Abstract: Much African land currently has low productivity and has attracted investors purchasing (or leasing) land as a speculative option on higher future prices or productivity. If land deals are to be beneficial they need to induce productivity enhancing investments. Some of these will be publicly provided (infrastructure, agronomic knowledge), and some can only be provided by ?pioneer? investors who discover what works and who create demonstration effects. Such pioneers can be rewarded (incentive compatibly) for the positive externalities they create by being granted options on large areas of land. However, pioneers must be separated from speculators by screening and by requirements to work a fraction of the land.

Keywords: Land deals; Farmland; Africa; Rent; Lease (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O13 O55 Q1 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr and nep-agr
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Land Deals in Africa: Pioneers and Speculators (2012)
Working Paper: Land Deals in Africa: pioneers and speculators (2011)
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