Concentration horizontale et relations verticales

Marie-Laure Allain and Saïd Souam ()

No 2005-31, Working Papers from Center for Research in Economics and Statistics

Abstract: This paper studies horizontal mergers in vertically related markets. In atwo-level Cournot model, with an intermediate and a final market, we show thatdownstream mergers inducing size effects are, ceteris paribus, more profitablethan upstream ones. Moreover, a merger at one level reduces the incentivesto merge at the other level. Endogenizing the firms' decisions to merge byconsidering a merger game supports the previous results.

Pages: 29
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Concentration Horizontale et Relations Verticales (2007)
Working Paper: Concentration Horizontale et Relations Verticales (2007)
Working Paper: Concentration horizontale et relations verticales (2006)
Working Paper: Concentration horizontale et relations verticales (2004)
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