Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information

Carsten Helm and Michael Neugart

Publications of Darmstadt Technical University, Institute for Business Studies (BWL) from Darmstadt Technical University, Department of Business Administration, Economics and Law, Institute for Business Studies (BWL)

Abstract: With ideological parties being better informed about the state of the world than voters, the true motivation of policy proposals is hard to judge for the electorate. However, if reform proposals have to be agreed upon by government members with heterogeneous policy preferences, it may become possible for the government to signal to the voters its private information about the necessity of reforms. This provides a rationale why coalition governments may find it easier to implement reforms than single-party governments, why oversized coalitions are formed, and why governments sometimes have cabinet members from opposing parties.

Date: 2024-09-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-ipr and nep-mic
Note: for complete metadata visit http://tubiblio.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/149718/
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Published in Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 3 (2024-09-16) : pp. 383-406

Downloads: (external link)
https://tuprints.ulb.tu-darmstadt.de/27387
https://doi.org/10.1628/093245613X13620416111362

Related works:
Journal Article: Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information (2013)
Working Paper: Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information (2013)
Working Paper: Coalition Governments and Policy Reform with Asymmetric Information (2009)
Working Paper: Coalition governments and policy reform with asymmetric information (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:dar:wpaper:149718

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