Bargaining with partially revocable commitments: a simple model

Gonzalo Olcina (), Antoni Cunyat () and Vicent Calabuig ()
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Vicent Calabuig: Universitat de Valencia

Economics Bulletin, 2002, vol. 3, issue 30, 1-7

Abstract: Fershtman and Seidmann (1993) showed that the presence of an irrevocable endogenous commitment with a fixed deadline results in the so called deadline effect. We examine the robustness of this result to the presence of a much more general class of commitments: partially revocable commitments.

JEL-codes: C7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-12-13
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