Heterogeneity in a Class of Two-Player Games

Charles Figuieres and Frédéric Rychen ()
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Frédéric Rychen: GREQAM - IDEP, University of the Mediterranean

Economics Bulletin, 2011, vol. 31, issue 1, 426-435

Abstract: In two-player games with negative (positive) spillovers it is well-known that symmetric agents both overact (underact) at the Nash equilibria. We show that for heterogeneous agents this rule of thumb has to be amended if the game features strategic substitutability.

Keywords: heterogeneity; over(under)-investment; strategic complementarity; strategic substitutability; two-player games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D6 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-01-26
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Related works:
Working Paper: Heterogeneity in a class of two-player games (2011)
Working Paper: Heterogeneity in a Class of Two-Players Games (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ebl:ecbull:eb-10-00309

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