Endogenous mergers and maximal concentration: a note

Emilie Dargaud

Economics Bulletin, 2012, vol. 32, issue 1, 137-146

Abstract: This article examines the incentive to merge in a Bertrand competition model with generalized substitutability and price competition. The model suggests that acquisition of firms by their rivals can result in maximal concentration of the industry.

Keywords: endogenous mergers; concentration; price competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L1 L2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-01-13
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Endogenous mergers and maximal concentration: a note (2012)
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