Deterrence versus Intrinsic Motivation: Experimental Evidence on the Determinants of Corruptibility

Bjorn Frank and Günther Schulze
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Bjorn Frank: University of Hohenheim

No 950, Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers from Econometric Society

Abstract: This paper reports on an experiment of corruption that was conducted in two treatments: one with the possibility of detection and one without. It turns out that monitoring reduces corruption through deterrence; at the same time, it destroys the intrinsic motivation for honesty. Thus the net effect on overall corruption is a priori undetermined. We show that the salary level has an influence on corruption through increased opportunity costs of corruption, but fail to find evidence for a loyalty effect. Interesting policy conclusions emerge.

Date: 2000-08-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Deterrence versus intrinsic motivation: Experimental evidence on the determinants of corruptibility (2003)
Working Paper: Deterrence versus intrinsic motivation: Experimental evidence on the determinants of corruptility (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ecm:wc2000:0950

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