Identifying social norms using coordination games: Spectators vs. stakeholders

Hande Erkut, Daniele Nosenzo and Martin Sefton

Economics Letters, 2015, vol. 130, issue C, 28-31

Abstract: We investigate social norms for dictator game giving using a recently proposed norm-elicitation procedure (Krupka and Weber, 2013). We elicit norms separately from dictator, recipient, and disinterested third party respondents and find that elicited norms are stable and insensitive to the role of the respondent. The results support the use of this procedure as a method for measuring social norms.

Keywords: Social norms; Dictator games; Norm elicitation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (43)

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Working Paper: Identifying Social Norms Using Coordination Games: Spectators vs. Stakeholders (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:130:y:2015:i:c:p:28-31

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2015.02.021

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