Minimal stable voting rules

Héctor Hermida-Rivera

Games and Economic Behavior, 2025, vol. 153, issue C, 541-553

Abstract: In this paper, I characterize minimal stable voting rules and minimal self-stable constitutions (i.e., pairs of voting rules) for societies in which only power matters. To do so, I first let players' preference profiles over voting rules satisfy four natural axioms commonly used in the analysis of power: non-dominance, anonymity, null player, and swing player. I then provide simple notions of minimal stability and minimal self-stability, and show that the families of minimal stable voting rules and minimal self-stable constitutions are fairly small. Finally, I conclude that political parties have evolved to ensure the minimal self-stability of otherwise not minimal self-stable constitutions.

Keywords: Voting rules; Constitutions; Minimal stability; Minimal self-stability; Power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Working Paper: Minimal Stable Voting Rules (2025)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:153:y:2025:i:c:p:541-553

DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.006

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