Hierarchies, incentives and collusion in a model of enforcement

Ajit Mishra

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2002, vol. 47, issue 2, 165-178

Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (31)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Hierarchies, Incentives And Collusion In A Model Of Enforcement (2000)
Working Paper: HIERARCHIES, INCENTIVES AND COLLUSION IN A MODEL OF ENFORCEMENT (1996)
Working Paper: HIERARCHIES, INCENTIVES AND COLLUSION IN MODEL OF ENFORCEMENT
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:47:y:2002:i:2:p:165-178

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