On the equivalence of Nash and evolutionary equilibrium in finite populations

Burkhard Hehenkamp, Alex Possajennikov () and Tobias Guse

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2010, vol. 73, issue 2, 254-258

Abstract: This paper provides sufficient and partially necessary conditions for the equivalence of symmetric Nash and evolutionary equilibrium in symmetric games played by finite populations. The conditions are based on generalized constant-sum and "smallness" properties, the latter of which is known from models of perfect competition and large games. The conditions are illustrated on examples including oligopoly games.

Keywords: Nash; equilibrium; Evolutionary; stability; Finite; populations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (32)

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Related works:
Working Paper: On the Equivalence of Nash and Evolutionary Equilibrium in Finite Populations (2009)
Working Paper: On the Equivalence of Nash and Evolutionary Equilibrium in Finite Populations (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:73:y:2010:i:2:p:254-258

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