Punishment, Reward, and Cooperation in a Framed Field Experiment

Charles N. Noussair, Daan van Soest and Jan Stoop

No 2011-12, Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series from Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University

Abstract: We report a framed field experiment, in which we study the effectiveness of punishment and reward in sustaining cooperation in a social dilemma. Punishments tend to be directed at non-cooperators and rewards are assigned by those who are relatively cooperative. In contrast to the results typically found in laboratory experiments, however, we find that punishments and rewards fail to increase cooperation.

Keywords: Field experiment; public goods game; social preferences; punishment; reward (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 C93 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26
Date: 2011-10
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:exc:wpaper:2011-12

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