Merger Profitability in Unionized Oligopoly

Kjell Lommerud (), Odd Rune Straume and Lars Sørgard

Norway; Department of Economics, University of Bergen from Department of Economics, University of Bergen

Abstract: We examine how a merger affects wages of unionized labour and, in turn, the profitability of a merger under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. If unions are plant-specific, we find that a merger is more profitable than in a corresponding model with exogenous wages. In contrast to the received literature, we find that it can be more profitable to take part in a merger than being an outsider. For firm-specific unions, on the orther hand, results are reversed.

Keywords: MERGER PROFITABILITY; TRADE UNIONS; ENDOGENOUS WAGES (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J51 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2000
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Merger Profitability in Unionized Oligopoly (2001)
Working Paper: Merger Profitability in Unionized Oligopoly (2000)
Working Paper: Merger Profitability in Unionized Oligopoly (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:bereco:1000

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