The Consistency Principle for Set-Valued Solutions and a New Direction for Normative Game Theory

Martin Dufwenberg, Henk Norde, Hans Reijnierse () and S. Tijs

Working Papers from Uppsala - Working Paper Series

Abstract: We extend the consistency principle for strategic games (Peleg and Tijs (1996)) to apply to solutions which assign to each game a collection of product sets of strategies. Such solutions turn out to satisfy desirable properties that solutions assigning to each game a collection of strategy profiles lack. Our findings lead us to propose a new direction for normative game theory.

Keywords: GAME; THEORY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 18 pages
Date: 1998
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The consistency principle for set-valued solutions and a new direction for normative game theory (2001)
Working Paper: The Consistency Principle for Set-valued Solutions and a New Direction for Normative Game Theory (1998)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:uppaal:1998-11

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