Strategic Behavior and Learning in Repeated Voluntary-Contribution Experiments

Laurent Muller (), Martin Sefton, Richard Steinberg and Lise Vesterlund
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Laurent Muller: GAEL - Laboratoire d'Economie Appliquée = Grenoble Applied Economics Laboratory - UPMF - Université Pierre Mendès France - Grenoble 2 - INRA - Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique

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Abstract: Voluntary contribution experiments systematically find that contributions decline over time. We use a two-stage voluntary contribution game to investigate whether this decrease is caused by learning or strategic behavior. Using a strategy method we find a robust pattern of declining contributions: contributions in stage 2 are 45 percent lower than in stage 1. Repeating the game five times we find that experience generates a smaller decline in contributions: stage 1 contributions decrease by around 7 percent per game. Finally we find no significant differences between the strategy and direct-response method, which suggests that our results help explain behavior in the latter.

Keywords: Social; Sciences; &; Humanities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008-08-15
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-00614682v1
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (88)

Published in Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 2008, 67 (3-4), pp.782-793. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2007.09.001⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Strategic behavior and learning in repeated voluntary contribution experiments (2008)
Working Paper: Strategic Behavior and Learning in Repeated Voluntary-Contribution Experiments (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-00614682

DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2007.09.001

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