Malleable Lies: Communication and Cooperation in a High Stakes TV Game Show

Uyanga Turmunkh, Martijn van den Assem and Dennie van Dolder
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Uyanga Turmunkh: LEM - Lille économie management - UMR 9221 - UA - Université d'Artois - UCL - Université catholique de Lille - Université de Lille - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We investigate the credibility of nonbinding preplay statements about cooperative behavior, using data from a high-stakes TV game show in which contestants play a variant on the classic Prisoner's Dilemma. We depart from the conventional binary approach of classifying statements as promises or not, and propose a more fine-grained two-by-two typology inspired by the idea that lying aversion leads defectors to prefer statements that are malleable to ex-post interpretation as truths. Our empirical analysis shows that statements that carry an element of conditionality or implicitness are associated with a lower likelihood of cooperation, and confirms that malleability is a good criterion for judging the credibility of cheap talk.

Date: 2019-03-27
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

Published in Management Science, 2019, 65 (10), ⟨10.1287/mnsc.2018.3159⟩

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Journal Article: Malleable Lies: Communication and Cooperation in a High Stakes TV Game Show (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-02110662

DOI: 10.1287/mnsc.2018.3159

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