Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks

Stephen Leider, Markus Mobius, Tanya Rosenblat and Quoc-Anh Do
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Stephen Leider: Ross School of Business - University of Michigan [Ann Arbor] - University of Michigan System

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Abstract: We conducted online field experiments in large real-world social networks in order to decompose prosocial giving into three components: (1) baseline altruism toward randomly selected strangers, (2) directed altruism that favors friends over random strangers, and (3) giving motivated by the prospect of future interaction. Directed altruism increases giving to friends by 52% relative to random strangers, whereas future interaction effects increase giving by an additional 24% when giving is socially efficient. This finding suggests that future interaction affects giving through a repeated game mechanism where agents can be rewarded for granting efficiency-enhancing favors. We also find that subjects with higher baseline altruism have friends with higher baseline altruism.

Keywords: Social network; Reciprocity; Altruism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-11
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://sciencespo.hal.science/hal-03461752
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (104)

Published in Quarterly Journal of Economics, 2009, 124 (4), pp.1815 - 1851. ⟨10.1162/qjec.2009.124.4.1815⟩

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Related works:
Journal Article: Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks (2009)
Working Paper: Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks (2009)
Working Paper: Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks (2009)
Working Paper: Directed Altruism and Enforced Reciprocity in Social Networks (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03461752

DOI: 10.1162/qjec.2009.124.4.1815

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