Comparing Two Ways for Eliminating Candidates in Three-Alternative Elections Using Sequential Scoring Rules

Dominique Lepelley and Hatem Smaoui ()
Additional contact information
Hatem Smaoui: CEMOI - Centre d'Économie et de Management de l'Océan Indien - UR - Université de La Réunion

Post-Print from HAL

Abstract: We compare in this paper two classes of sequential scoring rules: the first class eliminates at each step the candidate with the lowest score whereas the second one eliminates the candidates whose scores are equal to or lower than the average score of the candidates remaining in contention. We show that, in three-candidate elections, the second method is susceptible to improve the ability of the sequential scoring rules to avoid monotonicity paradoxes, but this benefit is offset by a decrease in the Condorcet efficiency of these rules.

Keywords: Scoring rules; Monotonicity paradoxes; Condorcet efficiency; Nanson elimination rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-08
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Published in Group Decision and Negotiation, 2019, 28 (4), pp.787-804. ⟨10.1007/s10726-019-09618-5⟩

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Comparing Two Ways for Eliminating Candidates in Three-Alternative Elections Using Sequential Scoring Rules (2019)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-03544910

DOI: 10.1007/s10726-019-09618-5

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Post-Print from HAL
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CCSD ().