Motivated information acquisition and social norm formation

Eugen Dimant (), Fabio Galeotti () and Marie Claire Villeval
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Marie Claire Villeval: GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon - Saint-Etienne - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UJM - Université Jean Monnet - Saint-Étienne - EM - EMLyon Business School - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique

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Abstract: We investigate how individuals select sources of information about peers' behavior and normative views, and the influence of this social information on individual behavior and both empirical and normative expectations. This is explored through two experiments (N=1,945; N=2,414) using a lying game, with and without known political identification. Our findings reveal a self-serving bias in the selection of information sources, with a preference for lenient sources (i.e., those presenting more tolerant empirical or normative information about lying), particularly when these sources align with an individual's political identity. We observe that being exposed to information that suggests lying is more socially acceptable increases lying behavior. Additionally, while people's normative expectations are not swayed by observing their peers' actions, these expectations are influenced by information about what peers believe is the right thing to do, underscoring the role of normative information in shaping social norms.

Keywords: Social norms; Information acquisition; Peer effects; Group identity; Lying; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: https://hal.science/hal-04740082v1
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Published in European Economic Review, 2024, 167, pp.104778. ⟨10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104778⟩

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04740082

DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2024.104778

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