Designing Interrogations

Alessandro Ispano and Péter Vida
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Péter Vida: THEMA - Théorie économique, modélisation et applications - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique - CY - CY Cergy Paris Université, Corvinus University of Budapest

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Abstract: We provide a model of interrogations with two-sided asymmetric information. The suspect knows his status as guilty or innocent and the likely strength of the law enforcer's evidence, which is informative about the suspect's status and may also disprove lies. We compare prosecution errors in the equilibrium of the one-shot interrogation and in the optimal mechanism under full commitment. We describe a back-and-forth interrogation with disclosure of the evidence that implements the optimum in equilibrium without any commitment.

Date: 2024-11-08
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Published in Review of Economic Studies, 2024, 91 (6), pp.3504-3531. ⟨10.1093/restud/rdae002⟩

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Journal Article: Designing Interrogations (2024)
Working Paper: Designing Interrogations (2021)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:hal-04982914

DOI: 10.1093/restud/rdae002

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