Profit Versus Win Maximization in a League: A Paradox

Luc Arrondel, Richard Duhautois and Jean-François Laslier

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Abstract: The paper studies a very simple game‐theoretical model of sports competition such as the European football leagues. In this oligopoly‐type context, the Cournot‐Nash equilibrium reveals a paradoxical differentiation between clubs: those that include not only profit but also sporting performance in their objectives end up generating more profit than others who purely maximize profit.

Keywords: Cournot-Nash equilibrium; Football; Oligopoly; Sports economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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Published in Scottish Journal of Political Economy, inPress, ⟨10.1111/sjpe.70014⟩

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Journal Article: Profit Versus Win Maximization in a League: A Paradox (2025)
Working Paper: Profit Versus Win Maximization in a League: A Paradox (2025)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-05144129

DOI: 10.1111/sjpe.70014

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