Courts: the Lex Mundi Project

Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes () and Andrei Shleifer

Scholarly Articles from Harvard University Department of Economics

Abstract: In cooperation with Lex Mundi member law firms in 109 countries, we measure and describe the exact procedures used by litigants and courts to evict a tenant for nonpayment of rent and to collect a bounced check. We use these data to construct an index of procedural formalism of dispute resolution for each country. We find that such formalism is systematically greater in civil than in common law countries, and is associated with higher expected duration of judicial proceedings, less consistency, less honesty, less fairness in judicial decisions, and more corruption. These results suggest that legal transplantation may have led to an inefficiently high level of procedural formalism, particularly in developing countries.

Date: 2003
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (58)

Published in The Quarterly Journal of Economics

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http://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/29408123/w8890.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Courts: The Lex Mundi Project (2003)
Working Paper: Courts: The Lex Mundi Project (2003)
Working Paper: Courts: The Lex Mundi project (2002)
Working Paper: Courts: The Lex Mundi Project (2002)
Working Paper: Courts: the Lex Mundi Project (2002)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hrv:faseco:29408123

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