Statistical Inference as a Bargaining Game

Eduardo Ley

No 2002/081, IMF Working Papers from International Monetary Fund

Abstract: This paper extends the analogy, previously established by Learner (1978a), between a Bayesian inference problem and an economics allocation problem to show that posterior modes can be interpreted as optimal outcomes of a bargaining game. This bargaining game, over a parameter value, is played between two players: the researcher (with preferences represented by the prior) and the data (with preferences represented by the likelihood).

Keywords: WP; contract curve (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13
Date: 2002-05-20
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Related works:
Journal Article: Statistical inference as a bargaining game (2006)
Working Paper: Statistical Inference as a Bargaining Game (2006)
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